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Abstract
We consider the impact of the scarcity of plenary time in legislatures both
on the outcome of the legislative bargaining process and the organization of
the legislature itself. We do so by developing a novel model that we call
scheduling auctions. In the model, the legislature is charged with allocating
a fixed budget. Members can propose an allocation and the scheduling agent
decides which one of the possible proposals will be considered by the entire
legislature in plenary session for an up or down vote. We show in this simple
setting that deciding which member should be selected as the scheduling
agent endogenously induces the creation of nascent political parties that we
call proto-parties. We also show that the these legislative structures have
positive welfare implications.
JEL codes: C78, D44, D71, D72
1. INTRODUCTION
Time is a scarce commodity across most human endeavors. Here we consider the
impact of the scarcity of plenary time in legislatures both on the outcome of the legislative
bargaining process and the organization of the legislature itself. Plenary time is the
period that a legislative body is in plenary session when important bills are considered
by formally stated motions that must be voted upon.1 The standard solution in almost
all legislatures is to create offices that manage the scarse floor time by endowing the
holders of these offices with special agenda-setting powers (Cox 2006, see also Cox and
McCubbins 1993, and Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist 1969). For example, in the U.S.
∗We are grateful to David Baron, Douglas Bernheim, Gary Cox, Daniel Diermeier, Harold Demsetz,
Timothy Feddersen, Matias Iaryczower, Matthew Jackson, Matt Kahn, Preston McAfee, Kenneth Shep-
sle, Guido Tabellini, Barry Weingast, and William Zame, as well as seminar audiences at WZB, UCSD,
Universidad de Granada, and CERGE.
1For example, it is not possible that a legislature could meet in a plenary session for more than 24
hours a day and often there are constitutional limits on the number of days a given legislature can be
in session.
House of Representatives most scheduling matters are handled by the Rules Committee,
arguably the most powerful committee in the chamber.2
We develop a simple formal model of legislative bargaining with such a scheduling
agent that we refer to as a scheduling auction. In the model, the legislature is charged with
allocating a fixed budget. Members can propose an allocation and the scheduling agent
decides which one of the possible proposals will be considered by the entire legislature in
plenary session for an up or down vote. If the proposal passes then it is implemented,
and if not, some exogenous status quo allocation is implemented. The model, therefore,
resembles an auction for the lone available legislative slot where the proposals are the
bids. This competition for floor time induces the legislators to undercut one-another’s
proposals in a manner that is quite similar to price competition a´ la´ Bertrand. This leads
the scheduling agent to capture much of the rents from the division of the pie.
The question then becomes which of the legislators will be afforded this potentially
lucrative role. Instead of pinpointing the specific legislator or procedure by which this is
done, we instead identify a specific group of legislators who have a common incentive to
select the scheduling agent from amongst themselves. This group, which we call the proto-
party, is large enough to be able to push forth their choice by majority approval. Members
of the proto-party have a common incentive to restrict the choice of the scheduling agent
to one of them. Clearly, this increases the likelihood that one of them will be selected for
this important role. Additionally, the proto-party indirectly helps members by increasing
the likelihood that their preferred proposal is actually enacted.
We show that in most cases, the proto-party is comprised of a majority of legislators.
There also exist cases where the proto-party is larger than a majority. Interestingly
enough, there are also cases where the proto-party is just shy of a majority, and anecdotal
evidence suggests that such cases do occassionally perspire in real-life legislatures.3
What is perhaps most surprising is that we are able to provide a simple rationale
for the existence of party structures, a key feature of legislative organization, in a one-
shot purely-redistributive setting of dividing a budget where legislators’ preferences are
completely heterogeneous (and adversarial). That is, we provide a complete model of
legislative bargaining where parties arise endogenously purely by the need to solve the
legislative scheduling problem. Further, we show that when the scheduling agent is
selected from a proto-party, such arrangements in most cases lead to higher social welfare
relative to a content-neutral scheduling, where the likelihood that a bill is considered by
the legislature is independent of the bill’s content.
2In fact, the Rules Committee also gets to choose the rules for the vote, which gives it even more
power (see http://www.rules.house.gov/ ).
3That occured, for example in the 1994 elections to the California State legislature. resulted in a
narrow win for the GOP, leading to a messy process of electing the Speaker of the House, who has large
scheduling powers. Ultimately, one of the Republican legislators declared himself an independent, and
voted in favor of the choice promoted by the Democrats. Abstracting from the messy details of the
story (see e.g., The Chicago Tribune, December 12, 1994, “California Assembly At A Standstill”), this
situation corresponds very tightly to the case where the proto-party is just shy of a majority.
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The rationale for political parties presented here is quite different from the explana-
tions in the rich literature on political parties.4 Typically, models of legislative party
formation assume some signalling value to the voters who must elect legislators, see Sny-
der and Ting (2002) or Levy (2004), but in our model there is no election stage and our
setting is one of complete information. There is an alternative thread in the literature
that looks at the rise of political parties from the need to overcome some organization
efficiency problems within the legislature, see Cox and McCubbins (1993) and (2005).5
However, these tend to be more empirically motivated and they do not provide a com-
plete model of legislative bargaining that incorporates these structures endogenously.
Our approach is motivated by these studies.
The only other model which builds on endogenous incentives within the legislature
that we are aware of is Jackson and Moselle (2002). Their explanation is based on
overall efficiency gains from the party structure, which is not the case in the purely
redistributive setting considered here. Related is also recent work by Diermeier and
Vlaicu (2011), whose argument for political parties in a multi-dimensional model stems
from the legislators’ correlated preferences.6 Our results, on the other hand, are being
driven purely by the procedural requirements to run a legislature with finite legislative
time.
The standard models of legislative bargaining either ignore any scarcity of plenary
time or deal with it implicitly by a content-neutral scheduling mechanism. For example,
in Shepsle (1979) the legislators are divided into committees, and each committee is the
monopoly supplier of proposals in their given policy jurisdiction with guaranteed access
to a floor vote for their proposed bill, but there is no scarcity of floor time in his model.
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), on the other-hand, explicitly model the scarcity of time in a
dynamic model where the payoff from the ultimate policy enacted is discounted by the
length of time to pass the bill, but assume that Nature randomly selects a legislator to
make a proposal.
Another strand of the literature models the legislative scheduling problem, but ab-
stracts from either bargaining or scarcity of floor time. For example, Cox and McCubbins
(1993) examine the order the scheduling agent would have proposals voted on in a non-
strategic multi-armed bandit model, where there is no impact of competition on proposal
behavior. McKelvey and Riezman (1992) take a different approach whereby the recogni-
tion probability of a member is determined by a seniority rule in order to endogenously
generate an incumbency advantage for the members of the legislature, but they assume
independent scheduling.
4In political science, the literature dates at least as far back as the works by Duverger (1951) and
Riker (1962). A few classic on the economic side of this literature are Stiegler (1971), Becker (1983),
and Kalt and Zupan (1984).
5This approach is the theory of industrial organization applied to legislative design. It motivated
by the seminal work of Demsetz (1985), who compares features of political parties to organizational
arrangements in market settings.
6In the real world, there may also be other, less utilitarian rationales for political parties, see e.g.,
the work by Krehbiel (1993) and Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991).
3
Then there have been a number of papers on endogenous agenda formation, such
as Banks and Gasmi (1987), Patty and Penn (2008), and Penn (2008), but these are
best characterized as determining the amendment tree of a single bill and again assume
independent scheduling of the final votes. Related is also work on legislative procedures,
such as Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), who study a vote of confidence procedure and
show it creates incentives for members of ruling coalitions to vote together. Levy and
Razin (2010) analyze a dynamic model of an all-pay contest of agenda formation where
the probability to get a proposal on the agenda is increasing in an agent’s payment, and
there is a probability that the session ends before any proposal is implemented. Diermeier
et. at (2011) study allocation of procedural rights by a majority, and Eguia end Shepsle
(2013) study allocation of procedural rights in a dynamic bargaining model. Finally,
Palmer (2013) gives a rationale for a majority to collectively allocate scheduling rights
to one legislator. In short, while there is a rich volume of studies, we are not aware of
any theories of legislative bargaining in the literature that would explicitly model the
scarcity of plenary time as well as its impact on policy decisions and the structure of the
legislature.
On the more technical side, scheduling auctions bears the most similarity to the
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. However, there are crucial
differences. First, in a scheduling auction a bill’s content affects the chances it is afforded
for consideration by the full chamber. Second, the two models differ in terms of their
mechanics. In Baron and Ferejohn (1989) the legislative session is modeled as an infinite-
horizon legislative bargaining game. Here, the legislative session is modeled as a one-
shot game, where in case of an impasse the legislators obtain their shares under some
exogenously given status quo distribution. Finally, our model allows for the possible
specification of legislated constraints, which are some additional constraints that must be
observed in the distribution of resources.
In terms of policy implications, our main result (Theorem 1) is that the surplus to the
scheduling agent is given as the residual surplus after the relatively cheapest majority have
been compensated for their status quo shares.7 In contrast, in Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
the surplus to the proposing agent is determined as the residual amount after the minimal,
or cheapest, winning majority of legislators have been compensated for their expected
continuation values that would obtain had they voted against the proposed distribution.
Thus, adding legislated constraints to the model explicitly leads to potentially quite
different quantitative as well as qualitative predictions. Moreover, depending on the
legislated constraints and the status quo, the winning majority need not be minimal, but
may in fact be a supra-majority (Proposition 3). This latter implication is observed in
real legislative sessions, and cannot be obtained in models that build on the Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) framework, e.g., Jackson and Moselle (2002).8
7A legislator’s relative cost is her status quo share minus the legislated constraint specifying the
minimal share to that legislator.
8This also provides empirically plausible scenarios against Riker’s (1962) intuition that winning coali-
tions should be minimal.
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The exogenous specification of the status quo and the legislated constraints might at
first blush seem a less desirable feature of our model. However, both of these parameters
should be possible to estimate in most practical applications, for example, in many cases
the law specifies the division of the budget in case of an impasse. But the status quo can
also be thought of as a reduced form of continuation values from some dynamic bargaining
procedure, much like the one in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Using this insight we in fact
derive as a special case of an scheduling auction a very simple exposition of the Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) model. This immediately yields the uniqueness of the stationary
equilibrium distributions in their original model, see also Eraslan (2002). The legislated
constraints, on the other hand have a very real impact on the structure of the legislative
outcomes, and self-interested groups of individuals might have strong incentives to put
such constraints in place.9 These parameters thus add additional flexibility to the model,
making the model more maleable for empiricial analysis, while also making its mechanics
simpler than the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model.10 It is precisely this tractability of
the predictions of our model that makes it amenable to the study of the emergence of
political parties and their consequence on aggregate welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a simple
model of legislative bargaining. In Section 3 we develop the scheduling auction. We then
turn to the endogenous selection of scheduling agent and the formation of proto-parties
in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the welfare comparison of the content-neutral
scheduling and the scheduling auction. There we also derive the Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) model as a special case of the content-neutral scheduling in our setting.
2. THE MODEL
We consider n + 1 legislators, where we think of these legislators as representatives
of some constituencies. The set of legislators is denoted by N = {1, ..., n, n+ 1}. In our
model of a legislature, all legislators except one, indexed by ι ∈ N , can make proposals.
Apart from representing a constituency, ι has a special role as the scheduling agent and
we shall explain that role in a moment.
The setting of this paper is one of distributional politics. The kind of political decision
that we have in mind is, for example, the decision to split a budget between the different
constituencies. In that setting the policy space is given by Rn+1, with some additional
restrictions of two different sorts. The first kind of restriction is a budgetary restriction.
We normalize the size of the budget to 1, so that the set of all possible policy outcomes
9In fact, our idea is inspired by the work of Stiegler (1971) who argued that groups of self-interested
individuals will likely press for legislated constraints that will increase their benefits and will in fact make
such groups even more cohesive. While our model is static, and legislated constraints are exogenous,
such legislated constraints in our model figure importantly in providing common incentives to a group
of legislators.
10The experimental study by Frechette et al (2005) suggests that additional degrees of freedom might
be necessary for empirical applications of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model.
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satsifying the budgetary restriction is formally represented by {x ∈ Rn+1 |∑n+1i=1 xi ≤ 1};
dimension i represents the share of the budget that is allocated to the constituency of
legislator i. In general, the set of possible budget allocations might also be restricted by
some existing legislation. We therefore call the restrictions of this second kind legislated
restrictions.
Legislated restrictions are some exogenous legislative constraints, for example, a lower
or an upper bound on resources that may be allocated to a given constituency. In prin-
ciple, legislated restrictions might also allow for some constituencies to subsidize others,
i.e., for the set of all policy outcomes to be negative on the dimensions of such generous
constituencies. We shall exclude such possibilities and assume that the allocation to all
constituencies must be non-negative. The set of all policy outcomes is then given by
B¯(0) = {x | ∑n+1i=1 xi ≤ 1, xi ≥ 0,∀i}. A more general possibility considered here is
that the allocation to different constituencies must be above some vector of lowest pos-
sible shares, b ∈ B(0), in which case the set of all possible policy outcomes is denoted
by B¯(b) = {x | ∑n+1i=1 xi ≤ 1, xi ≥ bi}; in general we will denote the set of all policy
outcomes by B.11
In our model, we also specify a status quo allocation to the legislators, xsq ∈ Rn+1. One
interpretation of the status quo is that it is the split of the budget which is implemented
in case of an impasse. For example, xsq, might be “the last-year’s budget”, or it might
be some legally imposed distribution of resources, which comes in effect if the legislative
assembly fails to pass any budget proposal. A different interpretation of xsq is that
it reflects how different legislators view the shares they would still find acceptable. For
example, a legislator with a high share under the status quo can be interpreted as “tough”
relative to a legislator with a low share. The status quo can be viewed as a result of how
constituencies elect their representatives: a given constituency might elect a legislator
who is tougher or softer at the bargaining table. Finally, the status quo can also be
viewed as the continuation value that a legislator might receive in some dynamic game
(with a scheduling auction as a stage game), were the game not to end in the first stage.
In subsequent sections we will discuss the implications of the latter two interpretations
in greater detail. We will assume that the point xsq lies within the budget set, xsq ∈ B.
In the first static part of this study, we will assume that xsq is an exogenous parameter
of the model.
The preferences of each legislator are represented by a utility function ui, where we
assume that each legislator cares only about the allocation to their own constituency.
Thus, given a feasible allocation x ∈ B, the utility of legislator i is given by ui(xi), where
ui : R → R+ is some differenetiable, increasing and concave function. In our examples
we will mostly consider the case where each legislator’s utility function is linear in the
share of the budget she obtains, ui(xi) = xi.
To compare different legislative arrangements we assume that there is some socially-
11The most general possibility is that the set of all possible policy outcome is some convex, closed,
and bounded set, B ⊂ {x ∈ Rn+1 |∑n+1i=1 xi ≤ 1}.
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optimal feasible allocation of resources, denoted by xo. For example, this socially-optimal
allocation might be a maximizer of the social welfare function W (x) =
∑n+1
i=1 ui(xi), and
xo is then given by,
xo = arg maxW (x), s.t., x ∈ B.
When legislators’ utility functions are linear, a welfare comparison between a policy x
and xo is particularly simple – the welfare loss relative to the socially optimal policy is
simply the linear distance between xo and x. Further assumptions regarding xo will be
specified in our examples.12 The welfare loss associated with the policy x relative to xo
is then,
W¯ (x, xo) =
n+1∑
i=1
|xi − xoi |. (1)
For example, when the social optimum is given by the most egalitarian policy, xo =
( 1
n+1
, ..., 1
n+1
), and that is feasible, i.e., xo ∈ B, then the welfare loss of policy x is simply,
W¯ (x, xo) =
n+1∑
i=1
|xi − 1
n+ 1
|.
3. THE SCHEDULING AUCTION
Our model of legislative decision-making is the scheduling auction. The scheduling
auction represents a legislative session where the split of the budget must be decided
and is modeled as an extensive-form game, which proceeds in three stages. To simplify
notation of this section we assume that the scheduling agent ι is fixed as legislator n+ 1,
ι = n+ 1.13
• In the first stage, each legislator i ∈ {1, ..., n} makes one proposal, which is a
budget proposal of a feasible allocation of resources to all legislators, including
the scheduling agent, n + 1. A proposal of legislator i is thus given by a feasible
allocation of the budget mi ∈ B, i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Denote by m ∈ Bn the vector of all
legislators’ proposals.
• In the second stage, the scheduling agent ι selects the proposal that she likes best
among all the proposed budget allocations. Given the vector of proposals m, the
scheduling agent’s choice is denoted by xA(m) ∈ {mi | i ∈ {1, ..., n}}.
12Given W (x) =
∑n+1
i=1 ui(xi) and B = B¯(0), if the legislators’ utilities are linear, then W (x) =∑n+1
i=1 xi, and any x, s.t.,
∑n+1
i=1 xi = 1 will be a maximand of W . Thus, any specific social optimum will
in that case entail additional assumptions, e.g., that there is some social loss stemming from inequality.
In contrast, when legislators’ utilities are strictly concave and ui = uj , ∀i, j, then by concavity of ui, the
egalitarian policy is socially optimal under this W (.).
13Here we define an scheduling auction where all legislators except the scheduling agent may be
proposers. More generally, the set of proposers might be restricted to some subset of the legislators –
e.g., the legislators who actually have access to the floor when it comes to budgetary decisions.
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• In the third stage, the whole legislative body simultaneously cast votes between
the status quo, and the selected proposal xA(m). The vote is an up or down vote
between xA(m) and xsq. The vote by legislator i is denoted by di(x
A(m), xsq) ∈
{aye, nay}, i ∈ {1, ..., n+ 1}, and d = (d1, ..., dn+1) denotes the vector of all votes.
The final outcome of the scheduling auction is given by the q − majority voting
correspondence, where q is an exogenous parameter, q ≥ 1
2
. Therefore, in general, xA(m)
is the outcome of the scheduling auction if, |{i∈N |di(x
A(m),xsq)=aye}|
n
> q, and to resolve ties,
we assume that the scheduling agent’s vote counts only as a tie-breaker.14 For example,
when q = 1
2
, and n+ 1 is an even number the scheduling agent’s vote effectively does not
count. Since the scheduling agent only has a tie-breaking vote, if dn+1 = aye, and,
|{i ∈ N \ {n+ 1} | di(xA(m), xsq) = aye}|
n
≥ q,
then the outcome of the scheduling auction is given by xA(m), and xsq, otherwise. To
illustrate the working of the scheduling auction consider an example.
Example 1. Suppose that there are a total of 4 legislators, n+1 = 4: 3 other legislators
and the scheduling agent ι = 4. Let q = 1
2
, b = (0.2, 0, 0.2, 0), and xsq = (0.3, 0.2, 0.3, 0.1);
note that xsq is not Pareto efficient. In the first stage legislators 1,2, and 3 make pro-
posals. Suppose these proposals are m1 = (0.4, 0, 0.2, 0.4), m2 = (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1),
m3 = (0.3, 0, 0.3, 0.4), so that m = (m1,m2,m3). First observe that these proposals
are all feasible, i.e., m ∈ B3, where B = B(b).
In the second stage, the scheduling agent ι selects one of these proposals. If she selects
m1, then in the third stage legislators 1 and ι vote in favor of m1, while 2 and 3 vote
against m1 in favor of x
sq. Since ι only has a tie-breaking vote, the outcome is xsq. If
ι selects m2, x
A(m) = m1, then in the third stage legislators 2,3, and ι vote in favor of
m2 so that the outcome is m2. Finally, if ι selects m3, then 2 votes against m3, ι votes
in favor of m3. Legislators 1 and 3 are indifferent so that the outcome depends on how
legislators 1 and 3 resolve their indifference. In particular, if at least one of them votes
against m3, the outcome is x
sq, and if both 1 and 3 vote in favor of m3, then the outcome
is m3.
In the extensive-form game representing the scheduling auction, a strategy si (mixed
or pure) of each player i ∈ N is defined in the usual way, by specifying that legislator’s
history-contingent actions at all points where he is to move. For each legislator other than
the scheduling agent, si = (mi, di(., .)); and for the scheduling agent, si = (A(.), d0(., .)).
A profile of strategies is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium SPNE if, at every history
where she is to move, each legislator chooses a plan of action to maximize her utility func-
tion, given the strategies of the other players. Thus, in the scheduling auction at stages
14In the US Senate, the Vice President has such a tie-breaking vote.
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1 and 2, legislators apply backwards induction in order to evaluate the consequences of
their actions on the final outcome.15
As in any voting model, xsq is always supported as an equilibrium outcome. The
reason is that if all legislators vote against the proposed policy xA(m), then if one of the
legislators changed her mind and voted in favor of xA(m) that would make no difference
as the majority would still vote in favor of xsq. On the flip side, whenever there exists a
group of legislators comprising a majority who prefer the proposed policy xA(m), voting
“nay” is weakly dominated for any legislator in this group. Hence, to avoid such outcomes
where no legislator votes for xA(m) because nobody else votes for xA(m), we focus on
equilibria in strategies which are weakly undominated at the voting stage. Since voting
is only done once, this assumption is equivalent to assuming truthful voting at the voting
stage whenever a legislator strictly prefers xA(m) over the status quo. From now on we
refer to SPNE in weakly-undominated strategies as equilibrium.16
Definition 1. An equilibrium of the scheduling-auction game is a SPNE where weakly
dominated actions are eliminated at stage 3.
We denote the equilibrium actions and strategies by a ∗ in the superscript, e.g.,
s∗0 = (A
∗(.), d∗0(., .)). We also denote a policy outcome resulting from an equilibrium of
the scheduling auction by xa∗.
The scheduling auction has similar features to Bertrand competition when producers
have potentially different costs. Similarly to such settings, all equilibria here in general
have the feature that at least one of the voters who weakly prefer xA(m) over xsq must
vote in favor of xA(m).17 As an illutration, modify the proposal m1 in the Example 1
above, so that instead of m1, legislator 1 makes a proposal m
′
1 = m3. Suppose that ι
selects m3 and at the voting stage both 1 and 3 break their indifference in favor of m3. By
applying backward induction it can easily be seen that such actions constitute a part of
equilibrium strategies. At the voting stage no legislator can make a profitable deviation.
Knowing that, at the selection stage the scheduling agent cannot do any better than
choosing either m′1 or m3. Finally, at the proposal stage, no legislator can profitably
deviate to making a different proposal. For legislator 1, any other proposal will either
not win approval at the voting stage or will yield less surplus to the scheduling agent,
and would consequently not be chosen by the scheduling agent; similarly for legislator
3. Legislator 2 also has no profitable deviation. She must either propose at least 0.2 to
15It seems plausible that in a legislative setting players are sufficiently sophisticated for SPNE to be
an appropriate equilibrium notion.
16Dominated actions at the voting stage can be illustrated in the above Example 1. If the chosen
proposal is m2, then voting “nay” is weakly dominated by “aye” for legislators 2 and 3. If, e.g., 2
votes against the proposal then 3 is indifferent between voting “aye” or “nay”, and if 2 votes for the
proposal then 3 is strictly better off voting “aye” If one did not eliminate weakly-dominated actions at
the voting stage, then practically any set of proposals may be justified as equilibrium proposals. In the
above example, if the scheduling agent thought that in the third stage all legislators will vote against
any move, she could then just as well select proposal m1, where the final outcome is x
sq.
17That is evidently the case when the status quo policy xsq yields different shares to the legislators,
and is in fact always the case, as long as the voting is not by strict consensus (that is q = 1).
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herself (to vote in favor of her own proposal at the voting stage), in which case, she can
propose at most 0.3 to the scheduling agent (since her proposal must lie in B(b)), so that
the scheduling agent would still choose m1, or she must propose at least 0.3 to legislators
1 and 3, in which case her proposal must equal m3 in order to be chosen by the scheduling
agent. In this example, an equilibrium policy x∗a is thus a move from the status quo,
which maximizes the scheduling agent’s utility under the constraint that some q-majority
of legislators approve the move. In the following Proposition 1 we establish that this is
true in general.
Proposition 1. Let q ≥ 1
2
, and let B = B¯(b), xsq ∈ B. Then, in any equilibrium of the
scheduling auction, the outcome is given by
xa∗ ∈ arg max
x∈B
un+1(xn+1),
s.t., ∃N¯ ⊂ {1, ...n}, |N¯ |
n+ 1
≥ q, and, uj(xj) = uj(xsqj ),∀j ∈ N¯ .
Proof. Given a proposal x ∈ B, let N¯(x) = {j ∈ {1, ..., n};uj(xj) ≥ uj(xsqj )}. At the
voting stage, take a proposal x ∈ B, such that un+1(xn+1) ≥ xsqn+1, and |N¯(x)|n+1 ≥ q. Assume
first that for any such proposal x, sufficiently many legislators who are indifferent between
xsq and x vote in favor of x, so that the outcome of such a vote is x.
Now take a vector of proposals m ∈ Bn, and assume there exists an i ∈ {1, ..., n},
such that |N¯(mi)|
n+1
≥ q and un+1(mi,n+1) ≥ xsqn+1. Suppose that there exists an x ∈ B, such
that un+1(x) > un+1(mi,n+1), and
|N¯(x)|
n+1
≥ q.
Case 1. If there ∃i′ ∈ N¯(x) \ N¯(mi), then set a proposal by i′, mi′ ∈ B, such that,
uj(mi′,j) = uj(x
sq
j ),∀j ∈ N¯(x), mi′,j = bj, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} \ N¯(x), and mi′,n+1 = 1 −∑
j∈{1,...,n} xj. Since x ∈ B, it follows that mi′ ∈ B, and un+1(mi′) ≥ un+1(x). Since
ui′(mi′,i′) = ui′(x
sq) > ui′(mi,i′). Therefore, i
′ would have a strict incentive to propose
mi′ , and n+ 1 would also strictly prefer mi′ over mi, so that mi could not be an outcome
of the scheduling auction.
Case 2. If N¯(x) ⊂ N¯(mi), then first let i′′ ∈ arg maxj∈N¯(mi) mi,j − xsqj .
If mi,i′′ − xsqi′′ > 0, then let i′ ∈ arg minj∈N¯(mi)mi,j − xsqj ; if minj∈N¯(mi) mi,j − xsqj =
maxj∈N¯(mi)mi,j−xsqj , then let i′ be any proposer in N¯(mi)\{i′′}. Next set  ∈ (0,mi,i′′−
xsqi′′).
If mi,i′′−xsqi′′ = 0, then it must be that N¯(mi)\ N¯(x) 6= ∅; otherwise, since x,mi,n+1 ∈ B,
it would have to be that mi,n+1 = 1 −
∑
j∈N¯(mi) x
sq
j ≥ xn+1, which would contradict
un+1(x) > un+1(mi,n+1). So take a iˆ ∈ N¯(mi) \ N¯(x), set  ∈ (0, xsqiˆ − biˆ), and fix i′ to be
any proposer i′ ∈ N¯(x).
Now set mi′ , such that mi′,i′ = mi,i′+,mi′,j = x
sq
j ,∀j ∈ N¯(x), mi′,j = bj,∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}\
N¯(x), and mi′,n+1 = 1 −
∑
j∈{1,...,n}mi′,j. As before, it is immediate that mi′ ∈ B,
N¯(mi′) = N¯(x), i
′ would have a strict incentive to propose mi′ , and n+ 1 would strictly
prefer mi′ over mi, so that mi could not be an outcome of the scheduling auction.
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Next, suppose that for any proposal x ∈ B, sufficiently many legislators who are
indifferent between x and xsq vote in favor of xsq, such that xsq is the outcome of the
vote whenever possible. Formally, let N¯−(x) = {i ∈ N¯(x) | ui(xi) = ui(xsqi ), di(x, xsq) =
“nay”} and N¯+(x) = {i ∈ N¯(x) | di(x, xsq) = “aye”}.
Now take an x ∈ B, such that un+1(xn+1) > xsqn+1, |N¯(mi)|n+1 ≥ q, and |N¯
+(x)|
n+1
< q, so
that the outcome of a vote between x and xsq is xsq. Then take an x′, where relative to
x, a small amount of resources is redistributed from n+1 to sufficiently many legislators,
so that, |N¯
+(x′)|
n+1
≥ q, and un+1(x′n+1) > xsqn+1. Therefore, the outcome of a vote between
x′ and xsq is x′, so that any legislator in N¯+(x′) \ N¯+(x) would have an incentive to
propose x′ over x, and n + 1 would also at the second stage choose x′ over x, foreseeing
the outcome of the vote at the third stage. Hence, no x, such that un+1(xn+1) > x
sq
n+1
could in that case be the outcome of the vote. But by the same argument as in cases
1 and 2, there would now exist another outcome x′′ (by bringing any of the legislators
in N¯+(x′) \ N¯+(x) closer to their indifference relative to x′), which would still pass the
vote, and be strictly prefered by n+ 1. Hence, in any outcome of the scheduling auction,
sufficiently many legislators who are indifferent must vote in favor of the proposal over
xsq, which concludes the proof.
Consider again the equilibrium in Example 1 where legislators 1 and 3 propose
m′1 = m3 = (0.3, 0, 0.3, 0.4), with the equilibrium outcome x
a∗ = (0.3, 0, 0.3, 0.4). As
described in Proposition 1, this policy xa∗ is a solution to maximizing the scheduling
agent’s share, under the constraint that a minimal-winning majority is in favor of the
proposal (here 1 and 3, along with 4 who only has a tie-breaking vote). But policy xa∗ is
not supported by the cheapest winning majority in the sense that, e.g., legislators 1 and
2 could have constituted a cheaper majority supporting the move. However, because of
the legislated constraint on legislator 3, such move could yield at most 0.3 to the agenda
setter. Nevertheless, xa∗ is supported by a majority who under xsq obtain minimal shares
relative to b. Thus, x∗ is supported by a relatively cheapest majority. From Proposition
1 we can derive the following Theorem 1, which characterizes equilibria of the schedul-
ing auction as policies which are supported by a relatively cheapest majority and yield
maximal share to the scheduling agent. The intuition is that in order for legislated con-
straints to be satisfied, the scheduling agent’s share will be highest when legislators with
the smallest difference between their status quo shares and their legislated constraints
are included in the majority supporting the move.
Theorem 1. Let q ≥ 1
2
, and let B = B¯(b), xsq ∈ B. Then, any outcome of the scheduling
auction is given by xa∗, such that,
xa∗ ∈ arg min
x∈B, s.t., N¯(x)
n+1
≥q
∑
i∈N¯(x)
(xsqi − bi). (2)
Moreover, |N¯(x
a∗)|
n+1
≥ q, xa∗i = xsqi , ∀i ∈ N¯(xa∗), xa∗i = bi,∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} \ N¯(xa∗), and
xa∗n+1 = 1−
∑
i∈{1,...,n} x
a∗
i .
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Proof. By Proposition 1, any outcome of the agenda auction must yield the highest
possible payoff to the scheduling agent, subject to the constraint that a q-majority of
legislators who are indifferent between the proposal and xsq vote in favor of the proposal.
Take an outcome of the scheduling auction x, and take the q-majority of legislators voting
in favor of x, N¯(x), where |N¯(x)|
n+1
≥ q. Suppose that N¯(x) included a legislator i, such
that xsqi − bi > xsqj − bj, for some legislator j ∈ {1, ..., n} \ N¯(x). By Proposition 1,
xi = x
sq
i and xj = bj. Then consider a proposal x
′, such that x′i = bi, x
′
j = x
sq
j , x
′
k = xk,
∀k ∈ {1, ..., n} \ {i, j}, and x′n+1 = 1 −
∑
i∈{1,...,n} x
′
i. Hence, |N¯(x′)| = |N¯(x)|, but
x′n+1 = xn+1 + (x
sq
i − bi)− (xsqj − bj) > xn+1, which is a contradiction.
Theorem 1 shows that in order for a policy xa∗ to be an outcome of the scheduling
auction, xa∗ must be weakly preferred by a relatively cheapest q-majority of legislators.
Every other legislator j is expropriated up to their legislated constraint bj. The legislators
who are expropriated are those where the relative gain from expropriation is highest. This
is quite different from the existing models in the literature – in those models, in particular
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) the majority voting in favor of an outcome will be a cheapest
majority, while the prediction here is that the majority approving an outcome will be
a relatively cheapest majority. This distinction can be qualitatively and quantitatively
important.
To illustrate the difference between the absolute and the relative majority, consider
the legislative environment depicted in Figure 1 below.
In this example, the voting rule is simple majority, q = 1
2
, relative costs are on the
horizontal axis, and absolute costs are on the vertical axis. The scheduling agent is
denoted by an asterisk, and there are 10 other legislators denoted by black dots, a total
of 11 legislators. Note that in this example, neither the legislated constraints nor the
status quo are on the Pareto-frontier. The legislators to the left of the vertical dashed
line are those that are included in the relatively cheapest majority, while the legislators
below the horizontal dashed line are those that are included in the cheapest majority.
The scheduling agent is included in any winning majority, and in this example her vote
breaks the tie. Clearly, the cheapest majority and the relatively cheapest majority are
quite different. The share allocated to the scheduling agent is much larger under the
relatively cheapest majority, as the legislators must be compensated by their relative and
not absolute costs. Taking into account the legislated constraints can therefore make a
difference, both qualitatively as well as quantitatively.
We have the following immediate corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Any equilibrium outcome of the scheduling auction is on the Pareto-
efficient frontier.
From Theorem 1, it is evident that in any outcome of the scheduling auction, the
scheduling agent is favorable to the equilibrium outcome over the status quo; it is also
immediate that the agenda setter is indifferent between the two only when the two are
equal.
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Figure 1: Relatively-cheapest majority.
Corollary 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the scheduling agent prefers xa∗ to
xsq, i.e., uι(x
a∗
ι ) ≥ uι(xsqι ). The scheduling agent is indifferent, i.e., uι(xa∗ι ) = uι(xsqι ), if
and only if, xsq = xa∗.
From Theorem 1 we can derive several other positive implication. In our previous
analysis, we set the scheduling agent as n + 1, i.e., ι = n + 1 to simplify our notation;
recall that in general ι ∈ N , and denote by xι∗ an equilibrium outcome of the scheduling
auction with ι as the scheduling agent.
In Proposition 2, we show that the outcome of the agenda auction equals the status
quo, if and only if, the status quo is Pareto efficient, and the status quo shares coincide
with legislated constraints for all legislators (except perhaps the scheduling agent).
Proposition 2. Additionally to the conditions of Theorem 1, let q ≤ n−1
n
, i.e., approving
the move does not require consensus. Then xι∗ = xsq, if and only if, xsq is Pareto efficient
and bi = x
sq
i ,∀i ∈ N \ {ι}.
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Proof. If xsq is on the Pareto-efficient frontier and bi = x
sq
i ,∀i ∈ N \{ι}, then by Theorem
1, xι∗i = x
sq
i , ∀i ∈ N \ {ι}, and xι∗ι = 1 −
∑
i∈N\{ι} = x
sq
ι , so that x
ι∗ = xsq. If either
xsq is not on the Pareto-efficient frontier, or there is an i ∈ N \ {ι}, such that xsqi > bi,
then since xsq ∈ B(b), either xsq = b and ∑i∈N xsqi < 1, or xsq > b. By Corollary 2,
xι∗ is on the Pareto-efficient frontier, so that in the former case, xι∗ 6= xsq. In the latter
case, we have maxj∈N\{ι} x
sq
j − bj > 0. Since by Theorem 1, the winning q−majority is
comprised of the legislators with minimal difference xsqj − bj. Since q ≤ n−1n the legislator
i∗ for whom this maximum is achieved is not in the minimal winning q−majority, so that
xsqi∗ > bi∗, and x
ι∗
i∗ = bi∗. Therefore, x
ι∗ 6= xsq.
Combining Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 the scheduling agent is therefore indifferent
between xι∗ and xsq only in the special case when xsqi = bi,∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, so that under
the status quo, the agenda setter has already extracted all possible surplus.
When xsqi = bi for fewer legislators than a q-majority, then the majority of legislators
supporting the proposal is minimal, in the sense that |N¯(x
a∗)|
n+1
≥ q > |N¯(xa∗)|−1
n+1
. When
xsqi = bi for more than a minimal majority of legislators, it can happen that a supra
majority of legislators vote in favor of the new proposed distribution of resources over
the status quo.
Proposition 3. Additionally to the assumptions of Theorem 1, assume that xsqi = bi for
more than a q−majority of legislators i ∈ N \ {ι}. Moreover, assume that all legislators
who are indifferent vote for the proposed move. Then, a supra majority of legislators
vote in favor of the proposed move.
Proof. By Theorem 1 a relatively-cheapest minimal majority of legislators obtain their
status quo shares, which is a subset of legislators with xsqi = bi. All other legislators
obtain a share equal to their legislated constraints, i.e., all legislators for whom xsqi = bi
are indifferent between the status quo and the outcome of the scheduling auction, and
this set comprises a supra majority.
For an illustration of Proposition 3, consider Figure 2 below.
In Figure 2, there are a number of legislators with 0 relative cost, and all those
legislators are included in the winning coaltion, along with the scheduling agent (again
denoted by an asterisk). Since these legislators comprise a supra-majority, the vote in
favor of the outcome is therefore approved by a supra-majority. If instead of the relative
cost the relevant determinant were the absolute cost, then the majority would here be a
minimal majority. The example given in Figure 2 gives a plausible configuration under
which the majority approving the outcome need not be minimal but can be a supra-
majority. A special case of such a supra-majority approved outcome is when legislated
constraints are all 0, and under the status quo 0 resources are allocated to a supra-
majority of legislators. Such a scenario seems much less plausible than one akin to that
in Figure 2, only in such special case would the absolute costs of the winning majority
also be 0.
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Figure 2: Supra majority.
The pervasive idea in the literature is that the winning majority will be minimal.
This idea dates back to Riker (1962) and probably further. In particular, approval by
minimal winning majorities obtains in models buliding on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
model of legislative bargaining.18 In practice supra-majorities do occur, and while one
may attribute such outcomes to the legislators’ concern regarding their voting records,
Proposition 3 gives conditions under which supra-majorities can occur in the setting of
purely redistributive politics with no reputational considerations.
In the scheduling auction the scheduling agent has a positive agenda power in the sense
that she chooses which proposal will ultimately be voted against the status quo. Through
the competition between the proposers, this positive agenda power then ultimately allows
18In the case of purely redistributive politics considered here, if xsq is on the Pareto-efficient frontier,
then the game between the legislators is zero-sum. In examples of non-redistributive politics, where
legislators may have non-consumption related preferences (i.e., spatial preferences over various policy
dimensions), the game need not be a zero-sum , but even in those settings, existing models mostly predict
exact majorities, e.g., Jackson and Moselle (2002).
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the scheduling agent to appropriate substantial rents. The predictions of equilibrium
outcomes of the scheduling auction are different in several ways from the prediction of
the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model, and the ensuing literature on legislative bargaining.
First, the majority voting in favor of an outcome will be a cheapest majority, while the
prediction here is that the majority voting in favor will be a relatively cheapest majority.
Second, in those models the majority approving the outcome is minimal. In contrast,
in reality supra-majorities are often observed, and in the present model such supra-
majorities are possible, depending on the status quo shares and the legislated constraints.
4. SELECTION OF THE SCHEDULING AGENT AND THE PROTO-PARTY
In this section we consider endogenous choice of the agenda setter. To that effect,
a loose sense of common interest among certain legislators leads to a natural proto-
party. We assume that voting is done by simple majority, q = 1
2
, and to not have to
consider a variety of cases, we assume that n+ 1 is odd. When it comes to selecting the
scheduling agent, each legislator will of course strictly prefer herself to be in that role.
That follows directly from Proposition 1: everything else equal, a legislator will obtain
the highest share when she is the scheduling agent. Consequently, there cannot be any
selection procedure by which the legislators could unanimously agree on whom should be
selected as the scheduling agent; there will also be no legislator who can unambiguously
win against every other legislator to serve as the scheduling agent in pair-wise majority
contests, i.e., there will be no Condorcet winner. Therefore, any specific procedure by
which the scheduling agent is chosen will necessarily have some indeterminacy.
Instead of specifying the precise procedure by which the scheduling agent is chosen, we
define a set of legislators who might possibly be selected into that role. By appropriately
defining this set of legislators, we will show that a majority of legislators will have aligned
interests for the scheduling agent to be chosen from within that set, in the sense of
expected budgetary gains for their respective constitutencies.19 Specific procedures will
then select the scheduling agent from that set of legislators. In particular, any procedure
satisfying what we define as majoritarian approval will select the scheduling agent from
this set. We call this set of legislators the proto-party.
Thus, in the scheduling auction, a loose party structure arises naturally even in the
environment of purely redistributive politics, in the absence of any demagogical prefer-
ences.20 An added benefit of this approach is that the subsequent results are independent
19This notion of a proto-party is in line with the existing ideas in the literature on political parties
– the proto-party can be viewed as a loose exogenous structure, which brings benefits to its member
by restricting their behavior in a specific way. This is consistent with Krehbiel (1993), and Jackson
and Moselle (2002) who distinguish between party-like behavior, and behavior that is effected by the
existence of a party.
20In the model of Jackson and Moselle (2002), for example, absent a party-structure, the voting
outcome can be inefficient and the party effects a Pareto improvement. In the real world, there may
be other less directly utilitarian rationales for political parties, for example, brand-recognition and
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of the precise identity of the scheduling agent, as long as the scheduling agent belongs
to the proto-party. We define the proto-party next, and show that it in most cases in-
cludes a majority of legislators; there are also some plausible scenarios under which the
proto-party might be just shy of the majority. We then define the notion of majoritar-
ian approval and show that choosing the scheduling agent from the proto party satisfies
majoritarian approval.
As before, ι ∈ {1, ...n + 1} denote the scheduling agent. Denote by N ι the set of all
other legislators who are included in some minimal winning majority of an equilibrium
outcome of the agenda auction when ι is the scheduling agent. That is, j ∈ N ι, if j 6= ι,
and there exists an xι∗, which is an equilibrium outcome of the scheduling auction when
ι is the agenda setter, and j belongs to a minimal-winning majority who voted in favor of
xι∗. Denote by Na the largest set of all legislators who can belong to a minimal-winning
majority regardless of what other legislator from Na is the scheduling agent. Formally,
Na = max{I ⊂ N | I ⊂ ∪j∈I
(∩i∈I\{j}N i)}.
We call Na the proto-party. Consider the following examples of the proto-party, Na.
Example 2.a. Suppose that all legislators are a priori equal, that is, bi = bj and
xsqi = x
sq
j ,∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., n+ 1}. In that case it is immediate that Na = {1, ..., n+ 1}.
Example 2.b. Now suppose that there is some set of legislators I, such that |I| ≥ n
2
+1,
and xsqi − bi < xsqj − bj, ∀i ∈ I,∀j 6∈ I. Moreover, suppose that I is such that xsqi − bi =
xsqi′ − bi′ , ∀i, i′ ∈ I. In other words, the difference between the status quo shares and
the legislated constraints is the same for all legislators in I, and this difference is smaller
than for any legislator outside I. Since there are more than a majority of legislators in
I, by Theorem 1, any winning majority in any equilibrium outcome of the scheduling
auction will be comprised of legislators from I. Moreover, since all legislators in I are
equally “expensive”, any legislator in I can belong to a minimal-winning majority, no
matter what other legislator is the scheduling agent. Hence in this case, Na = I.
Example 2.c. Finally, suppose that there are sets of legislators I and I ′, such that
I∩I ′ = ∅, |I| = n
2
, |I∪I ′| > n
2
+1, xsqi −bi < xsqi′ −bi′ < xsqj −bj, ∀i ∈ I, i′ ∈ I ′,∀j 6∈ I∪I ′,
and xsqi − bi = xsqi′ − bi′ , ∀i, i′ ∈ I ′. Thus, the legislators in I are relatively cheapest, but
they do not comprise a majority – they are just one legislator short of the majority. Along
with somewhat more expensive legislators in I ′, these two groups together comprise a
majority of legislators. Moreover, the difference between the status quo and the legislated
constraints is the same for all legislators in I ′. Again, by Theorem 1, the legislators
in I will evidently belong to any minimal-winning majority supporting an equilibrium
outcome of the scheduling auction, regardless of what other legislator is the scheduling
agent. However, for each legislator in I ′, when she is not the scheduling agent, she can
only belong to the minimal winning majority if the scheduling agent is chosen from I –
otherwise, the scheduling agent along with the legislators in I will make up a majority.
Therefore, if ι ∈ N \ I, then I ′ ∩ N ι = ∅. Consequently, legislators in I ′ will be in Na
only when |I ′| = 1, so that then Na = I ∪ I ′; if |I ′| > 1, then whenever ι ∈ I ′, no
reputation, see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991).
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other legislator in I ′ belongs to a minimal-winning majority, so that in that case Na = I.
Hence, in this example Na may be just short of a majority, whenever the set of median
relative cost legislators is comprised of more than one legislator.
Example 2.c. describes the case where the proto-party Na is just shy of a majority
of legislators.21 In the next Proposition 4 we show that this is essentially the only case
where the proto-party Na is comprised of less than a majority of legislators. For i ∈ N ,
let I i+ = {j ∈ N | xsqj − bj ≥ xsqi − bi} and I i− = {j ∈ N | xsqj − bj ≤ xsqi − bi}, i.e.,
the legislators in I i+ are those for whom the difference between the status quo and the
legislated constraints is at least as large as for i, and for legislators in I i− this difference
is weakly smaller. Now define the set of legislators with the median relative difference,
Nm = {i ∈ N | |I i−| ≥ n
2
+ 1, |I i+| ≥ n
2
+ 1},
and note that xsqi −bi = xsqj −bj, ∀i, j ∈ Nm, i.e., the relative difference must be the same
for all median legislators. Define the set of legislators for whom the difference between
status quo and legislated constraints is strictly less than for the legislators in Nm,
N l = {i ∈ N | xsqi − bi < xsqj − bj, j ∈ Nm}.
Note that the set N l might be empty, e.g., when the relative difference is the same for
all legislators in which case Nm = N .
In the next Proposition 4 we show that Na is comprised of a majority of legislators,
given by Nm∪N l, except for the case described in Example 2.c. Thus, in most cases the
proto-party is comprised of a majority of legislators with the lowest relative gain from
obtaining their status quo shares relative to their legislated constraints. When some
legislators’ relative gains coincide, the proto-party might be comprised of more than a
majority of legislators, or in a rather special case of less than a majority of legislators.
Proposition 4. Let the scheduling auction be given by B = B(b) and xsq ∈ B(b). If
|N l| < n
2
, or |Nm| = 1, then the proto-party is comprised of a majority of legislators
with the lowest differences between status quo and legislated constraints, given by Na =
N l ∪ Nm. Otherwise, if |N l| = n
2
and |Nm| > 1, then the proto-party is just shy of the
majority, and is given by Na = N l.
Proof. We apply Theorem 1, i.e., that any equilibrium outcome xa∗ of the scheduling
auction is supported by some relatively cheapest majority of legislators. Next, that
|N l ∪Nm| ≥ n
2
+ 1. Furthermore, for any equilibrium outcome xa∗, every legislator from
N l (appart from the agenda setter) is always included in the relatively cheapest majority
of legislators. Hence, N l ⊂ Na. Finally, no legislator from N \ (N l ∪ Nm) will ever
belong to a relatively cheapest majority when she is not the scheduling agent, so that
Na ⊂ N l ∪Nm. We have therefore established that,
N l ⊂ Na ⊂ N l ∪Nm. (3)
21Nevertheless, the legislators in I ′ would even then have a common interest with the legislators from
I to select the scheduling agent from I, rather than from outside I.
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Finally, suppose that ι ∈ N l. Since |N l| ≤ n
2
, and all legislators in Nm have the same
relative difference, every legislator in Nm then belongs to some relatively cheapest ma-
jority supporting any equilibrium outcome. Hence, the issue is, when ι ∈ Nm, whether
every other legislator in Nm belongs to some relatively cheapest majority supporting an
equilibrium outcome.
Consider now the case where |N l| < n
2
. Then, it must be that |Nm| ≥ 2, so that if
ι ∈ Nm, then at least one of the legislators in Nm will have to be included in the relatively
cheapest majority. Since all legislators in Nm have the same relative difference, every
legislator in Nm belongs to some relatively cheapest majority supporting any equilibrium
outcome. Therefore, in this case Nm ⊂ Na, and by (3), Na = N l ∪Nm.
Next, suppose that |N |l|| = n
2
and |Nm| = 1. Now it is trivially true that Nm ⊂ Na.
Finally, the case where |N l| = n
2
and |Nm| > 1 has been proven in Example 2.c, where
Na = N l.
In the rest of this section we give an argument for the proto-party based on the
assumption that the scheduling agent has to be approved by some majority of legislators.
We call this majoritarian approval.
In what sense are the incentives of the legislators in the proto-party aligned? The
proto-party is the smallest loose alliance which can assure that a legislator from within
the proto-party will be assigned into the role of the scheduling agent, and at the same
time guarantee to all of its members some prospective gain from participating in the
winning majority; when the proto-party consists of more than just a simple majority of
legislators, then some of the legislators will be in the winning majority with a positive
probability and their prospective gains will be their expecter gains from being selecter
the winning majority. Nevertheless, if both, the assignment of the agenda setter from
within the proto-party, and the membership in the winning majority are a result of a
random draw, then all members of the proto-party have a strict incentive to commit
to choosing the agenda setter from within the proto-party. We now construct such an
incentive argument for the proto-party.
Given b ∈ B(0) and xsq ∈ B(b), let X ι∗ be the set of all possible equilibrium outcomes
of the scheduling auction when ι ∈ N is the scheduling agent, i.e., X ι∗ = {xι∗ ∈ B(b) |
xι∗ eq. outcome under ι}. For each xι∗ ∈ X ι∗, denote by N¯(xι∗) the majority who vote
in favor of xι∗ over xsq as described in Proposition 1.22 Finally, denote by λi|ι the number
of outcomes in X ι∗, such that i is the member of the winning majority. Now assume that
if ι is the scheduling agent, all equilibrium outcomes in X ι∗ are equally likely, and let vi|ι
be the expected gain above bi that a legislator i 6= ι obtains if ι 6= i is the scheduling
22If there are more than a majority of legislators who are indifferent between a given outcome and the
status quo, then one can assume that all these legislators are in the winning majority. But this won’t
matter either way because the only time that can happen is when the status quo and the legislated
constraints coincide for all legislators in the winning majority including such additional legislators.
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agent,
vi|ι =
1
|X ι∗|λi|ι (x
sq
i − bi) .
Finally, for I ⊂ N , |I| ≥ n
2
+ 1, let vi|I denote the expected gain above bi, to legislator i,
if the scheduling agent is randomly chosen from the set I, and ι 6= i,
vi|I =
1
|I \ {i}|
∑
ι∈I\{i}
vi|ι.
As long as the scheduling agent must be approved by some majority of legislators, then
vi|I is positive if and only if i belongs to the proto-party. This is shown in the next
proposition.23
Proposition 5. Assume that the selection of the scheduling agent satisfies majoritarian
approval and that xsqi − bi > 0,∀i ∈ N . Then,
min
I⊂N ;|I|≥n
2
+1
vi|I > 0 ⇐⇒ i ∈ Na.
Proof. Take an i ∈ Na. By Proposition 4, the proto-party is either composed of a
majority in which case, Na = N l ∪Nm, or when |N l| = n
2
and |Nm| > 1, Na = N l. By
Theorem 1, legislators in N l are included in any winning majority, regardless of what
legislator is the scheduling agent. Hence, if i ∈ N l, then minI⊂N ;|I|≥n
2
+1 vi|I > 0 ⇐⇒ i ∈
Na. We now treat two separate cases.
Case 1. Na = N l, so that |Na| = n
2
. If i ∈ N \Na, then precisely all legislators in Na
are included in the winning majority, so that minI⊂N ;|I|≥n
2
+1 vi|I = 0,∀i ∈ N \Na.
Case 2. Na = N l ∪ Nm, so that |Na| ≥ n
2
+ 1. If i ∈ N \ Na, then i is never included
in the winning majority when she is not the agenda setter, so that minI⊂N ;|I|≥n
2
+1 vi|I =
0,∀i ∈ N \ Na. Now take i ∈ Nm. Suppose ι 6∈ N l, and take X∗ι. As in the proof of
Proposition 4, |N l| < n
2
, so that for any x∗ι ∈ X∗ι, N¯(x∗ι)∩Nm 6= ∅, by Theorem 1. Since
xsqi − bi = xsqi′ − bi′ ,∀i, i′ ∈ Nm, λi|ι > 0, ∀i ∈ Nm, which implies that vi|ι > 0,∀i ∈ Nm,
and consequently vi|I > 0,∀i ∈ Nm.
Proposition 5 shows that the proto-party rewards its members for supporting the se-
lection of the scheduling agent through (expected) benefits in the subsequent equilibrium
allocation of the shares of the budget. A different interpretation of the proto-party is that
if the scheduling agent is approved by some majority of legislators, then even in the one-
shot environment, the legislators in the proto-party derive benefits from the proto-party
in two ways. First, by restricting the choice of the scheduling agent to the proto-party,
which increases the likelihood of each legislator in the proto-party to be selected as the
scheduling agent, everything else equal. Second, by assuring that the scheduling agent is
selected from the proto-party, each legislator in the proto-party gets a positive expected
23The assumption that xsqi − bi > 0,∀i ∈ N is needed in Proposition 5 because otherwise some of the
relatively cheapest legislators would get zero relative gain simply by virtue of their status quo shares
and their legislated constraints being equal.
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benefit in the scheduling auction where she might otherwise get 0. More specifically, a
legislator in N l derives benefits from increased likelihood of being the scheduling agent,
and no additional benefit when she is not the scheduling agent, while a legislator from
Nm derives both kinds of benefits from the proto-party. By Theorem 1, for each legisla-
tor, the benefit of restricting the choice of the scheduling agent depends only on the size
of the group to which this choice has been restricted. In the next proposition we describe
the first kind of benefits, i.e., expected benefits to the members of the proto-party from
the outcome of the scheduling auction.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Na = N l∪Nm. If i ∈ N l, then vi|I = vi|I′ ,∀I, I ′ ⊂ N, |I| =
|I ′| = n
2
+ 1. Otherwise, if i ∈ Nm then for |I| = n
2
+ 1, vi|I is maximized when I ⊂ Na.
Proof. For the first part, by Theorem 1, the legislators in N l belong to every winning
majority. For the second part, if the scheduling agent is not chosen from Na, then one
of the legislators from Nm will be excluded from the winning majority. Therefore, when
she is not the scheduling agent, each legislator in Nm will derive a higher benefit when
the agenda setter is chosen from Na.
When Na = N l, then as long as ι ∈ Na, the legislators in Nm will still derive benefits
as their expected shares of the budget, so it is conceivable that they might still be willing
to support such a choice. One interpretation as to why the proto-party in that case
includes only legislators in N l is precisely that if the scheduling agent were to belong to
Nm, no other legislator in Nm would derive any benefits from the outcome of the agenda
auction.
The proto-party is thus the smallest group (up to legislators who are identical in
their relative costs) that can assure majoritarian approval of the scheduling agent from
its ranks through benefits to legislators who provided support for the scheduling agent.
In the knife-edge case, when the legislature is split, Na = N l, and the proto-party is
composed of a minority of legislators, some legislators who are not in the proto-party
must support the selection of the scheduling agent from the proto-party because it is in
their interest. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such situations do in fact perspire in
reality.24 Our analysis here has shown that if the choice of the scheduling agent satisfies
majoritarian approval, then the proto-party arises naturally, and the scheduling agent is
chosen from the proto-party.
We conclude the section with the following Theorem 4, describing conditions under
which the legislature is in a deadlock. If the scheduling agent can be any of the legislators
from the proto-party, then all equilibrium outcomes of the scheduling auction coincide
with the status quo (i.e., for every possible scheduling agent), if and only if, both xsq
24As mentioned in the introduction, a situation closely corresponding to the case where the proto-party
is just shy of a majority occured in the 1994 the elections to the California House of Representatives
– after a narrow win for the GOP, in the process of electing the Speaker of the House, who has large
schedulingpowers, one of the Republican legislators ultimately declared himself an independent, and
voted in favor of the choice promoted by the Democrats.
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and b are on the Pareto-efficient frontier. Hence, that is the case only when the legis-
lated constraints are so severe that B(b) consists of a single possible policy, which must
therefore also coincide with xsq. Thus, when the scheduling agent is selected from the
proto-party, the only possibility for the outcome of the scheduling auction to invariably
be in a deadlock is when the legislated constraints are so restricitive that no policy move
at all is possible.
Theorem 4. Let b ∈ B(0) and let xsq ∈ B(b), and suppose |Na| ≥ 2. Then xι∗ = xsq,
∀ι ∈ Na, if and only if, xsq and b are both Pareto efficient.
Proof. Fix an ι ∈ Na. By Proposition 2, all equilibrium outcomes xι∗ coincide with xsq
if and only if xsq is Pareto efficient, and xsqi = bi,∀i ∈ N \ {ι}. Since |Na| ≥ 2, it follows
that the claim is true, if and only if xsq is Pareto efficient and xsqi = bi,∀i ∈ N , i.e., b
and xsq are both Pareto efficient and coincide.
5. CONTENT-NEUTRAL SCHEDULING AND WELFARE COMPARISON
A different legislative institution from the scheduling auction is what we call the
content-neutral scheduling. Content-neutral scheduling is a simpler institution where the
decision of what proposal makes it to the floor is independent of proposals’ content. Most
voting and political-economy literature abstracts from the details of the agenda-setting
process by assuming such a content-neutral scheduling procedure. For example, Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) and the large ensuing literature on legislative bargaining assume
that rationing is probabilistic and that the probability of a proposer being selected is
independent of the substance of the proposal. Thus, under the content-neutral scheduling,
legislators have no incentive to craft their proposals in any particular, except to their
own benefit, and subject to majority approval. In contrast, in the scheduling auction
legislators compete in the amount of surplus they allocate to the scheduling agent. In this
section we compare the outcomes of the agenda auction to the content-neutral benchmark,
where the scheduling agent has no power.
In the content-neutral scheduling game, stages 1 and 3 are the same as in the agenda-
auction game; Stage 2 is eliminated. Instead, there is a random move by Nature prior to
stage 1, whereby Nature selects a proposer from the set of all legislators according to some
probability distribution Pr, where Pr(i) is the probability that legislator i is the proposer.
For example, when all legislators are picked with equal probabilities, Pr(i) = 1
n+1
. The
key is that these probabilities are indpendent of the legislators’ proposals so that in this
content-neutral scheduling game, proposers have no incentive to make proposals favorable
to the scheduling agent.
As in the agenda-auction, the equilibrium in the content-neutral scheduling game is
a SPNE, after the elimination of weakly-dominated actions at the voting stage. In the
content-neutral scheduling the outcome is generally stochastic since the selection from
among the proposals is stochastic. Conditional on the chosen proposer, that is, in each
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subgame after Nature has chosen a proposer the outcome is deterministic in any pure-
strategy SPNE. For a moment denote by x˜i∗ an equilibrium outcome of content-neutral
scheduling in the subgame where legislator i ∈ N has been chosen as the proposer. In each
such subgame, the proposer i makes a proposal to allocate the largest possible share of
available resources to herself, while satisfying the constraint of majority approval. Thus,
this outcome coincides with an equilibrium outcome in the scheduling auction where
ι = i, i.e., when i is the agenda setter. We formally state this in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. An allocation xi∗ ∈ B is an outcome of the subgame of the content-
neutral scheduling, where i is selected as a proposer, if and only if, xi∗ is an outcome of
the scheduling auction with i as the scheduling agent.
Proof. Suppose i is selected by Nature to be the proposer. Denote her equilibrium
proposal by xi∗. When choosing her proposal, i then solves the following optimization
program,
xi∗ ∈ arg max
x∈B
ui(xi),
s.t., ∃N ⊂ {1, ..., n+ 1}, |N¯ |
n+ 1
> q, and, uj(xj) = uj(x
sq
j ),∀j ∈ N.
The proof follows by Proposition 1.
By above Proposition 7, x˜i∗ = xi∗, so that we will occassionally slightly abuse the
notation and write simply xi∗ for the outcome of the content-neutral scheduling when i is
selected by Nature. From Proposition 7 and Theorem 1 we can immediately characterize
the outcomes of content-neutral scheduling in a subgame where i is chosen as the proposer.
Theorem 5. Let q ≥ 1
2
, and let B = B¯(b), xsq ∈ B. Then, under content-neutral
scheduling, any outcome in the subgame where i is chosen is given by xi∗, such that,
xi∗ ∈ arg min
x∈B, s.t., N¯i(x)
n+1
>q
∑
j∈N¯ i(x)\{i}
(xsqj − bj). (4)
Then xi∗j = x
sq
j , ∀j ∈ N¯ i(xi∗) \ {i}, xi∗j = bj,∀j ∈ {1, ..., n, n + 1} \ N¯ i(xi∗), xi∗i =
1−∑j∈{1,...,n+1}\{i} xi∗j , and |N¯ i(xi∗)|n+1 > q.
As an example of content-neutral scheduling consider the legislative bargaining game
of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In that game, there are potentially infinitely many periods.
In a given period, a proposer is randomly selected to make a proposal x ∈ B to the
legislative body. If the proposal is accepted the game ends with x and the corresponding
payoffs being the outcome, and if the proposal is rejected, the game proceeds to the
next period, where a proposer is again randomly selected, and so on, until the game
either ends, or it continues forever. The cost of delay between two consecutive periods
is represented by a time-discount factor of δ < 1, which is the same for all legislators,
and the legislators’ payoffs are given by the present discounted share of the pie that is
ultimately obtained. Proposition 7 and Theorem 5 allow for a very simple exposition
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of the Baron and Ferejohn model.25 We first interpret the legislators’ status quo shares
as their expected discounted continuation payoffs that they would obtain were the game
to continue under such a bargaining protocol. Since by propositions 1 and 7 the game
will end in the first round, the status quo shares are therefore counterfactual payoffs
that legislators would obtain were the game to continue. We then use Theorem 1 and
Proposition 7 to compute these status quo shares as off-equilibirum continuation values.
An outcome of such a content-neutral scheduling game can thus be interpreted as an
outcome of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining game.
Example: Legislative bargaining. In Baron and Ferejohn (1989) there are no
legislated constraints. Similarly, we here assume that the only legislated constraints are
that the allocation to each legislator must be non-negative, so that B = B¯(0). Denote by
δi < 1 the discount factor of legislator i, and as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) assume that
δ1 = δ2 = ... = δn = δn+1 = δ. Voting is by simple majority, q =
1
2
, and assume that there
is an odd number of legislators, i.e., n + 1 is an odd number. Finally, as in Baron and
Ferejohn (1989), assume that Nature chooses a proposer from amongst all legislators with
equal probabilities, so that Pr(i) = 1
n+1
. We now compute the hypothetical xsq, which
is given by the vector of continuation values should the current proposal be rejected; in
that case the game would enter the second identical round, with payoffs discounted by
δ. The game would then continue either until the proposal in one of the rounds is finally
accepted, or it would go on for infinitely many periods, in which case the final payoffs
to all legislators would be 0. The hypothetical xsq is thus the discounted (by δ) vector
of average payoffs before Nature’s move, which obtain in an equilibrium of this game.
This xsq hypothetical since by propositions 1 and 7, in any equilibrium a proposal will
be accepted in the first period. Nevertheless, xsq is the vector of discounted payoffs that
legislators obtain in an equilibrium and is itself important in determining the equilibrium,
i.e., xsq is a fixed point. Since the probability distribution of picking a proposer anew from
amongst the legislators is independent of the current proposer, xsq is also independent of
whomever the proposer might be. Given a proposal x ∈ B, the minimal majority needed
to pass a proposal is picked randomly.26 For each legislator, let xp denote the share
obtained when they are a proposer, and xm the share when they belong to a minimal
majority. Therefore, we have the two equations, xsqi = δ(
1
n+1
xp + 1
2
xm) = xm, and
xp = 1− n
2
xm, which yield,
xsqi = x
m =
2δ
2(n+ 1)− δ .
25We present the example with linear utility functions as in the original model of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989). The extension to more general concave utility functions is also immediate.
26The status quo xsq is a result of a similar procedure in the (hypothetical) second stage, i.e., as in
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) xsq is the equilibrium amount of resources given to legislator i, on average,
before Nature picks the proposer. Then it has to be that when composing a minimal majority to pass
the proposal, legislators are selected into that minimal majority with equal probabilities. To see this,
suppose that some legislator i had a lower likelihood of being a part of the winning majority. Then
i’s continuation value would be lower than other legislators’ continuation values, i.e., xsqi would be the
smallest. But then i’s vote would be effectively cheaper than any other legislators’ vote, so that i would
in fact be a member of any winning majority, a contradiction.
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To conclude this section, we compare the welfare under the content-neutral scheduling
and the scheduling auction, when the agenda setter is chosen from the proto-party. To
keep this welfare analysis simple, we assume that the proto-party comprises a majority
of legislators, so that Na = N l ∪Nm.
In the welfare comparison, an important determinant is the socially-optimal policy,
xo. For example, the socially-optimal policy xo might be the egalitarian policy, xo =
( 1
n+1
, ..., 1
n+1
). Our analysis here is more general, and we assume that the socially optimal
policy is not too unequal. More precisely, we assume that,
xoi ≤ 1−
 max
N ′⊂N,|N ′|=n
2
∑
j∈N ′
xsqj +
∑
j∈N\(N ′∩{i})
bj
 ,∀i ∈ N. (5)
The interpretation of inequality (5) is that when legislator i is the proposer, she is able
to obtain a larger than the socially-optimal share of resources. Alternatively, when (5)
is not satisfied the socially-optimal allocation is so distorted in favor of some legislator
i ∈ N that even if she were the agenda setter, her share would be still less than under
the social optimum. That the social optimum should be so distroted seems in most cases
implausible, and condition (refeq:ne) is in that sense relatively mild. When (5) and a
mild additional condition are satisfied, the scheduling auction generates a higher than
the content-neutral scheduling, i.e., the social-welfare loss is greater unde the content-
neutral scheduling. We show this in the next Theorem 6. Recall that W¯ (x, xo) denotes
the welfare loss of a policy x relative to the socially optimal policy, and this welfare loss
is given by (1). In what follows, denote N ca = {1, ..., n+ 1} \Na.
Theorem 6. Let B = B(b), 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1n+1 , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n+1}, let xsq ∈ B, let the socially-
optimal policy be given by xo, and Suppose the scheduling agent satisfies majoritarian
approval so that she is chosen from the proto-party, ι ∈ Na. If (5) holds, and additionally,
2 max
j∈Na
(xsqj − bj) ≥ max
j∈Na,i∈Nca
xoi − xoj , (6)
then, W¯ (xa∗, xo) ≤ W¯ (xc∗, xo), for any outcome xa∗ of the scheduling auction, and any
outcome xc∗ of the content-neutral scheduling.
Proof. Let xi∗ be the outcome of content-neutral scheduling when i ∈ {1, ..., n + 1} is
chosen by Nature as the proposer, and let xι∗ be the outcome of the scheduling auction
when ι ∈ Na is the scheduling agent. If i ∈ Na, then xi∗ is by Proposition 7 an outcome
of the scheduling auction and W¯ (xa∗, xo) = W¯ (xc∗, xo).
Now take i 6∈ Na. Note that the legislators in Nm ⊂ Na are those with the maximal
difference between their status quo share and their legislated constraint,
Nm = arg max
j∈Na
(xsqj − bj).
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Let N¯ i(xi∗) be a minimal winning majority needed for xi∗ to be voted up against xsq. Fix
the scheduling agent ι ∈ Na, and let N¯ ι(xι∗) be some corresponding minimal winning
majority needed to pass xι∗. Now observe that by Theorem 1 and Proposition 7, we can
take N¯ i(xi∗) =
(
N¯ ι(xι∗) \ {j})∪{i}, for some j ∈ Nmax. By Theorem 1, the equilibrium
share to ι in the outcome xι∗ is given by,
xι∗ι = 1−
∑
k∈N¯ ι\{ι}
xsqk −
∑
k 6∈N¯ ι
bk.
By Proposition 7, the equilibrium share to i in the outcome xi∗ is given by
xi∗i = 1−
∑
k∈N¯ i\{i}
xsqk −
∑
k 6∈N¯ i
bk.
Since N¯ i(xi∗) =
(
N¯ ι(xι∗) \ {j}) ∪ {i}, we obtain, xi∗i = xι∗ι + xsqj − bj ≥ xsqι . Therefore,
W¯ (xι∗, xo)− W¯ (xi∗, xo) = |xsqj − xoj | − |xoj − bj|+ |xι∗ι − xoι | − |xι∗ι + xsqj − bj − xoi |
By (5), xι∗ι − xoι ≥ 0, and xι∗ι + xsqj − bj − xoi ≥ 0, so that,
W¯ (xι∗, xo)− W¯ (xi∗, xo) = |xsqj − xoj | − |xoj − bj| − xoι − xsqj + bj + xoi . (7)
If xsqj ≥ xoj , then (7) becomes,
W¯ (xι∗, xo)− W¯ (xi∗, xo) = xoi − xoι − 2(xsqj − bj) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (6).
If xsqj < x
o
j , then (7) becomes,
W¯ (xι∗, xo)− W¯ (xi∗, xo) = 2(bj − xoj) + xoi − xoι ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (6) and xsqj < x
o
j .
Theorem 6 shows that under general and intuitive conditions, if the choice of the
scheduling agent satisfies majoritarian approval, the scheduling auction is socially pre-
ferred over content-neutral scheduling. The first condition states that the socially-optimal
outcome should not be too distorted in favor of a particular proposer (who happens to
be chosen under the content-neutral scheduling). The second condition states that the
variation in the socially optimal outcome should not be too large and should not simulta-
neously allocate the smallest shares to the proto-party Na from which the agenda setter
is selected.
The intuition behind Theorem 6 is as follows. When the scheduling agent is chosen
from the proto-party then the minimal-winning majority (without the scheduling agent)
will in most cases be more expensive in relative terms than if the scheduling agent were
chosen from outside the proto-party. In particular, if the scheduling agent is one of
the relatively cheap legislators, then an additional legislator from Nm must belong to
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the winning majority; when the agenda setter is a legislator from N ca, then a relatively
cheaper legislator can be included in the winning majority. Hence, the relatively cheapest
majority is slightly more expensive when the scheduling agent belongs to the proto-party.
This implies that the shares then more equally distributed among the legislators. If the
legislated constraints are not too unequal, and the social optimum is not too unequal,
the equilibrium outcome is then less unequal and hence closer to the social optimum.
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